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The author of the article set himself two main goals. The first goal was to out-
line, on the background of a specified definition of marriage, the fundamental 
changes to which the institution is currently subject (crisis of goals, privatiza-
tion, divorces, concubinages, same-sex relationships). The second purpose is the 
presentation of problems related to the recognition of natural law, to which the 
proponents of traditional understanding of marriage as a union of man and 
woman appeal. The point of reference was the conviction of a certain relation-
ship between the understanding of marriage and the underlying concept of 
natural law. Two basic concepts of natural law have been presented: Aristo-
telian-Thomistic and contemporary, whose consequences are indicated in the 
conclusions. Both concepts assume a certain understanding of human nature 
which, in the first case, is treated as static (the spiritual-physical structure) and, 
in the second case, as dynamic (intelligent freedom).
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Introduction
It is undeniable that both biological existence and social life are significant 
dimensions of a human being. Since man is a “biological preterm”, he needs 
other people and communities, both at the beginning of his life and at further 
stages of his development. Natural communities playing an important role in 
developing personal identity include the family, the nation and the state. The 
family, which is consequence of a previously contracted marriage, is of particu-
lar importance.
The analyses presented below have two fundamental aims. The first one is to 
outline, against a specific definition of marriage, significant changes which this 
institution is currently undergoing. The second aim is to show problems related 
to the approach to natural law, which the supporters of the traditional under-
standing of marriage as a union of a man and a woman refer to, since it seems 
that such a definition of marriage assumes an appropriate concept of natural 
law. In the 20th century, under the influence of certain philosophical trends, a 
new understanding began to prevail. It was also applied by representatives of 
the so-called “new theology” (e.g. Josef Fuchs, Franz Böckle, Alfons Auer, Klaus 
Demmer, Bernhard Häring and Peter Knauer). Consequently, attempts were 
made to redefine the notion of marriage and to use this term to describe other, 
not only heterosexual, forms of interpersonal relations. The point of reference 
for this discussion is, therefore, the belief about a certain relationship between 
the understanding of marriage and the underlying concept of natural law.
1. Marriage in the time of changes
Following the views of a Polish ethicist, Tadeusz Ślipko, three principal view-
points in the discussion on understanding the marriage can be distinguished: 
naturalistic, sociological-institutional and based on natural law. Supporters of 
the former emphasize that marriage is a human concept, which took an insepa-
rable monogamous form as a result of historical developments. In its external 
content, it is specified by the right of individuals to satisfy their drive towards 
pleasure and happiness (e.g. Jean J. Rousseau, John S. Mill, Herbert Spencer). 
Representatives of the second viewpoint believe that marriage is a product of 
society. However, it has supraindividual reality, distinct and independent of 
the will of individuals (e.g. Emil Durkheim, Marxists). Supporters of the third 
approach emphasize that this is an institution of natural law, by the power of 
which it was constituted as monogamous and inseparable. Its aim is personal 
improvement of the married couple and procreation (e.g. Christian ethicists).1
1 Tadeusz ŚLIPKO, Zarys etyki szczegółowej, Vol. 2, Etyka społeczna, Kraków, Wydawnictwo 
Apostolstwa Modlitwy, 2005, 144-145.
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Until recently, a common belief was held that marriage and family, as its 
consequence, are just natural forms of social life. It was considered that they 
had biological and psychological backgrounds. One of them is sexual differen-
tiation of human beings, permeating them entirely, both as regards somatically 
and psychologically. Human personality is subject to enhancement, among 
others, in this aspect. The principal aims of marriage include giving birth to 
and upbringing children, as well as development of personal love, involving the 
entire human being. Therefore, it requires monogamy and inseparability, as 
both those processes are out of their nature extended in time.2
Consequently, marriage consists in a union of persons of different genders, 
the internal reality of which consists of the spiritual experiences of love and 
procreation.3 Marriage is usually defined through a description of its features. 
Thus, it is perceived first of all as a union of a woman and a man, recognized by 
law, religion or custom. It is emphasized that marriage is a legal union, i.e. it is 
concluded in accordance with applicable law.4
Secondly, marriage is a community of people of different gender, granting 
by the power of natural law mutual rights and obligations for comprehensive 
development in procreative love. Several reasons are provided for the genesis of 
marriage under natural law. First of all, emphasis is put on sexual differentia-
tion in the biological and psychological sphere and the need to complement 
each other on all levels of marriage community. Secondly, the commonness of 
marriage in time and space speaks for its natural genesis. Thirdly, specific an-
thropological assumptions also have a significant impact. Man is understood 
as a rational being who, by the power of the primarily imperative of his moral 
nature, is driven towards personal improvement, which requires taking into 
account the social dimension. Improvement of the human being consists in the 
form of sexual intercourse, in which not only emotions, but also sexual activity 
directed towards the creation of a new life is important. The need of the human 
being to improve and to call to life a new human being assumes the existence 
of marriage as a permanent and monogamous interpersonal community. Its 
aim should be the development of spouses, corresponding to their personal 
dignity.5
Since marriage is treated as a kind of community, it is also assigned non-
institutional and informal attributes. Therefore, the unity of the separate in-
dividualities of a husband and wife, as well as the unity of purposes for which 
the marriage was concluded, are emphasized. The  community approach to 
marriage emphasizes the unity of actions, community of existence, common 
2 Mieczysław A. KRĄPIEC, Człowiek i prawo naturalne, Lublin, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 
1975, 160-164.
3 Ślipko, Zarys etyki szczegółowej..., 141.
4 Anna KOTLARSKA-MICHALSKA, Małżeństwo jako związek, wspólnota, instytucja, pod-
system i rodzaj stosunku społecznego, Roczniki Socjologii Rodziny, 10 (1998) 51-52.
5 Ślipko, Zarys etyki szczegółowej..., 146-153.
Karol Jasiński, Understanding of Marriage and the Concept of Natural Law446
gathering of goods, cooperation, planning and implementing tasks together, 
developing a strategy for shared life, intimacy of experiences, feeling, emo-
tional, sexual and intentional community. Marriage community is therefore a 
unity of expectations, unity of values, unity of actions and unity in responsibil-
ity for the permanence of the union. Unquestionably, relations matched both 
in terms of social and cultural features, but also in terms of personality and 
character features reveal a community nature. This means that people should 
be directed by shared motivations both at the moment of starting the union 
and while it lasts. If the notion of community is understood as a natural union 
of people for their common purpose and shared feelings, as well as concur-
rence of feelings and desires, then a marriage based on such foundations can be 
treated as a community.6
Marriage, being a union and a community between a woman and a man, 
makes at the same time the core of the family bringing up common children. 
Difference in the sexes of spouses is an inseparable element of marriage (fam-
ily) to make the fulfilment of the procreation function possible. It is also related 
to the function of taking care of the offspring and ensuring relations between 
the child and the parents. Primarily, the family was the most compact social 
group. It was treated as a community necessary for the proper functioning 
of the human species. Its aim was therefore to create conditions for creating 
and raising children in this world. The belief in the integrity of marriage and 
of a nuclear (two-generation) family has been strongly reinforced in cultural 
circles. Such a form was heavily affected by religion, particularly the Christian 
faith. It helped to indicate and shape the proper form of marriage and family. 
Its ultimate source was God’s intention. Therefore, all other forms of unions 
between people were considered improper. Currently, it is increasingly often 
emphasized that this approach towards the marriage is most justified from 
the perspective of a specific religion. Nevertheless, it is questioned whether 
it should continue to determine the shape of secular legislation governing the 
coexistence of people with different religious and moral backgrounds. A crisis 
in the traditional model of the nuclear family has been observed for several 
decades. This crisis is a consequence of civilisation changes. It has been noticed 
that the stability of marital unions is systematically decreasing in many coun-
tries. The reason is, among others, unsatisfactory involvement in marital rela-
tions. People are afraid of getting involved into deep and permanent relations 
with other people, for fear of losing their freedom and privacy. An increase in 
interest in concubinage can also be observed. Many people, even bringing up 
their children, function without getting married. A decrease in the number of 
marriages is accompanied by an increase in the number of divorces. It is even 
claimed that traditional marriage and family has entered a decadent phase. 
Nuclear family cohesion has weakened in almost every aspect. Entering into 
6 Kotlarska-Michalska, Małżeństwo jako związek…, 54-55.
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marriage, people aim not only for procreation, but also want to realize other 
purposes. However, their aims are often divergent. Moreover, these aims some-
times predominate in their lives. These include, among others, the need for 
spiritual and material coexistence, love, friendship, cooperation, responsibil-
ity for oneself and the nearest person, identity of the human being and safety. 
Additionally, in contemporary, mobile and pluralistic, multicultural societies, 
a diversity of human customs concerning marriage is becoming apparent. 
Undoubtedly, multiculturalism has significantly contributed to the discussion 
concerning the plausibility of a very narrow definition of marriage. Today, its 
broad meaning is increasingly often used. It is emphasized that this is an agree-
ment concluded before a representative of a society between at least two per-
sons. It provides a specific contract concerning common law, determining the 
mutual rights and obligations of parties7. It is assumed that this contract may 
cease to exist when both parties do not wish to fulfil their duties or if it ceases 
to bring notable benefits. While concluding this agreement, the issue of sexual 
identification and orientation of its partners is often neglected.
At the end of the 20th century, the postulate of legalisation of unions (mar-
riages) between people of the same sex has been strongly articulated, also 
becoming a subject of public debate in many states. It was the effect of overlap-
ping social processes, also affecting the legislation. At the same time, marriage 
started to be perceived as an institution not so much of a public nature, as 
first of all private one. It became less important as the subject of state interest, 
treated more often as an issue of autonomous decisions of individual people. 
The process of marriage privatization occurred at the same time as the process 
of eliminating minority discrimination. The view that started to prevail was 
that the criterion of a different sex of partners and the condition of the legal 
institution of marriage can be perceived as a manifestation of discriminatory 
practices. What was also observed was the evolution of social attitudes towards 
homosexuality itself. Arguments referring to freedom, justice and certainty 
of legal transactions have been advanced for institutionalization of same-sex 
relationships. On the other hand, principal arguments against institutionaliza-
tion of same-sex unions refer to religion and morality, demography and change 
of social relationships. Legal institutionalization of homosexual unions takes 
all forms differing in the scope of introduced rights and obligations, modes of 
regulations or the question of whether to create new legal regulations or intro-
duce new rules into the existing legal order. However, four leading regulatory 
models can be observed: marriage, registered partnership, civil-law contract 
and concubinage. Thus, it can be claimed that the tendency to broaden the 
7 Allan BLOOM, Umysł zamknięty. O tym, jak amerykańskie szkolnictwo wyższe zawiodło de-
mokrację i zubożyło dusze dzisiejszych studentów, trans. Tomasz Bieroń, Poznań, Zysk i S-ka, 
1997, 139-156; Anetta BRECZKO, O potrzebie redefinicji pojęć “małżeństwo” i “rodzina” we 
współczesnym pluralistycznym świecie. Rozważania w kontekście związków partnerskich, Mi-
scellanea historico-iuridica, 13 (2014) 2,  338-340.
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rights concerning informal unions to also cover homosexual partners is visible. 
Marriage is losing its heterosexual character and currently also includes same-
sex partners. Consequently, the need to redefine the notion of marriage has 
been increasingly often discussed.8 It is all the more important that in times 
following the sexual revolution, all forms of sexual relations that do not harm 
another person seem to be allowed.9
Therefore, marriage is undergoing a fundamental transformation process. 
On one hand, its crisis and sometimes disintegration is observed while, on the 
other, we are deal with an attempt to introduce its new forms. Their supporters 
do not seem to take into account existing cultural and religious conditions, or 
even the conditions of a biological nature, in particular in the perspective of 
the procreative purpose of marriage. Possibly, an increasing range of solutions 
offered by genetic bioengineering and medicine can provide a certain antidote 
against potential difficulties in this regard. However, the development of new 
forms of marriage has been strongly affected by the needs of individuals, par-
ticularly the need for self-fulfilment. The insights into the many biological, 
social and psychological aspects and functions of sexuality and relationship 
play also a crucial role in this development. It is worth emphasizing that a man 
striving for self-fulfilment shows no consideration for the condition of his na-
ture. He wants to transgress it, as he feels its owner and principal. Therefore, 
he forgets about natural law, which is violated, and its very idea is increasingly 
often questioned.
2. The issue of natural law
Let us examine the issue of natural law. Obviously, the analyses presented 
below are not meant to be exhaustive. A principal subject of interest will be to 
present the main assumptions of the traditional and the contemporary con-
cepts of natural law, which are not without effect on the understanding of mar-
riage, and to point out to significant differences between them.
It is worth emphasizing that the very expression of “natural law” is ambigu-
ous and its meaning is related to an understanding of nature itself.
The German philosopher Robert Spaemann observes that the word “na-
ture” generally draws its meaning from the notion that is opposed to it, e.g. 
physis-nomos. “Nature” meant then, on one hand, all that was not established 
by nomos, techne and freedom and, on the other, what provided the conditions 
for the human life to exist. Consequently, nature could be the individual and 
8 Breczko, O potrzebie redefinicji pojęć…, 343-348.
9 Bloom, Umysł zamknięty…, 114-125.
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specific structure of a human being, a hypothetical initial condition of a human 
being or the entirety of natural phenomena.10
The metaphysicist and anthropologist Mieczysław A. Krąpiec lists about 20 
meanings of the word “nature”. It can be used to denote certain external or 
internal factors of things (e.g. God, other birth-giving nature, essence, matter, 
form, union of elements, being-in-itself, substance), or to denote items (e.g. cos-
mos, the set of created beings, the subject of natural sciences, God, products of 
intellect, instinct, character). Strictly speaking, nature is the essence of a given 
thing being the source of action.11 Such a definition of nature is supported by 
Krąpiec, who places it in the entire system of his philosophical thought, in-
spired by the works of Thomas Aquinas.
The German philosopher Berthold Wald, similar to the ideas promoted 
by Krąpiec, mentions four principal notions of nature. First of all, there is an 
explicit notion of nature considered as non-created by God. It is atheleologi-
cal, identified with given observations, material and non-rational. Secondly, 
there exists a corresponding notion of nature considered as created by God, 
theleological and casually rational. Thirdly, there is an explicit concept of na-
ture considered as created, material and mechanistic. Fourthly, we also use 
an analogous notion of nature considered as non-created and specific form of 
life.12 Wald supports the second, analogous notion of nature, which fits well 
within his rational and theleological concept of reality.
On the margin, it is worth observing that theological visions of the world 
are not popular today. Its mechanistic image started to prevail in the 18th cen-
tury, which marked the breakthrough moment. The world was also opposed 
to all that was supernatural and began to be treated as an autonomous being 
(natura pura).13
The Polish ethicist Andrzej Szostek, following the thought of the German 
theologian Franz Böckle, provides four basic meanings of the term “nature”. 
First of all, nature is a priori knowledge of moral qualifications describing 
human deeds, which is expressed in synderesis as a call for responsible self-
determination. Secondly, nature means the unchangeable, metaphysical nature 
of the human being. Thirdly, nature is manifested in an intelligible significant 
structure of human deeds. Fourthly, nature is a bio-physiological human 
system.14 It seems that the first understanding of nature as a form of human 
10 Robert SPAEMANN, O prehistorii pojęcia natury w XVIII w., in: Robert Spaemann, Rousseau 
– człowiek czy obywatel. Dylemat nowożytności, trans. Jarosław Merecki, Warszawa, Oficyna 
Naukowa, 2011, 85-90.
11 Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne..., 54-55.
12 Berthold WALD, Natura i prawo naturalne – perspektywa historyczna, trans. Agnieszka Lek-
ka-Kowalik, in: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Katarzyna Stępień, Paweł Gondek (eds), Substancja. 
Natura. Prawo naturalne, Lublin, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006, 60-83.
13 Spaemann, O prehistorii pojęcia natury..., 91-101.
14 Andrzej SZOSTEK, Natura, rozum, wolność. Filozoficzna analiza koncepcji twórczego rozumu 
we współczesnej teologii moralnej, Rzym, Fundacja Jana Pawła II, 1990, 145-150.
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self-knowledge is currently prevailing. It also has an important effect on the 
contemporary concept of natural law, which consists in free and creative pro-
cess of self-determination and self-fulfilment of a human being. Other defini-
tions of nature, due to their apparent defects, meet with several objections. 
According to their opponents, the primary problem lies in distinguishing a 
specific metaphysical “constant” in the human being, as it is a historical, and 
therefore, changeable being. As regards the structure of deed, in their opinion, 
a too strong emphasis is put on the objective instead of a subjective aim, i.e. 
the intentions of the subject performing the deed. Finally, they charge the last 
one of the above-mentioned meanings of the term “nature” with biologism. The 
issue of biologism will be discussed later in the further part of the paper.
Krąpiec distinguishes four principal concepts of natural law that were 
common through history. The first of them is the ancient concept of the cos-
mo-theological law, which mentions the divine Logos permeating the entire 
cosmos, including the interior of the human being, providing sense and order 
(stoics, Plato, Aristotle). The second can be referred to as a psychological-theo-
logical concept of natural law, which binds the human being from the inside, 
participating in divine ideas entered into his structure of being (Augustine of 
Hippo). The third concept was proposed by Thomas Aquinas and it is referred 
to as the theory of analogous natural law. The third concept originates from the 
representatives of the natural law school, who identified the natural law with 
orders of natural reason, isolated from eternal law (e.g. Hugo Grotius, Thomas 
Hobbes, Samuel Puffendorf, Baruch Spinoza, German idealists).15 Krąpiec con-
sistently supports the concept of Aquinas, who understands nature as the es-
sence of things, being the source of activity, and identifies the natural law with 
the order of reason. Man is called to read the eternal law using his reason and 
to be guided by it in specific conditions of his existence. However, the age of 
Enlightenment saw the process of absolutisation of human reason begin, which 
instead of reading the norms of law, started to create them on its own. Thus, 
natural law has also changed its character.
Let us examine how natural law was understood in the philosophical tradi-
tion which derives inspiration from Aristotelian-Thomistic thought.
This concept of natural law was based on a specific understanding of nature. 
The term was used to describe all that could be experienced by man, under-
stood as a being capable of free and rational self-determination. Therefore, 
nature meant three things. First of all, the natural world and structures oc-
curring in this world (e.g. social, political and economic ones), as examined 
by empirical sciences. Secondly, the essence of being defined as a principle of 
acting (e.g. freedom, intelligence). Thirdly, some categories of human acts (e.g. 
15 Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne..., 55-85.
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speech).16 In case of the man, nature was understood primarily as a static and 
dynamic structure typical for him.17 Here, we are interested in nature defined 
as the second out of the three meanings listed above. 
This static-dynamic structure of a contingent being of man is a measure 
of his being and the method for his participation in the eternal law. This law 
is God Himself as the mind ruling the world and giving a sense to it. Because 
of Him, the structure of the human being is such and not another, which is 
manifested in inclinations for specific activities. Inclinations are the manifes-
tations of natural law and are manifested by reason. Only a rational being, 
which through law must determine itself, can be the subject of law. Man, as a 
rational being, participates in the eternal divine law through reason. Rational 
human nature reflects the eternal divine law, manifested in natural inclina-
tions for aims proper to nature, which include preserving life, the transmission 
of life and the development of personalities in society. Natural inclinations 
originate from the Absolute as the causative, model and purposeful cause. This 
participation of divine law in human intelligent nature is referred to as natural 
law. Its interpretation takes place in practical human cognition, referred to as 
conscience. Natural law is manifested in the voice of conscience, i.e. evaluation 
of practical reason, in the form of “do good”. The task of man is to learn this 
good and to determine his actions. Since every person is unique and has his 
own, discovered by individual conscience, way of behaviour, natural law cannot 
be explicit but analogous.18 Therefore, knowledge of law depends on the knowl-
edge of the human nature, whose conditions for full realization are manifested 
in natural inclinations. What is proper for a given being out of its nature and 
what should be realized in its activity can be determined through analogy. The 
normativity of nature is derived from the specific way of living of the beings 
created and it is always different.19
It can be observed that a rational creature is subject to eternal law in a spe-
cific and more perfect way. It participates in this law through its reasonable 
nature. A human being is directed by the learned law from inside, since in his 
conscience, he learns the truth about good that is binding for him.20
In this context, the Polish ethicist Tadeusz Ślipko defines natural law as a 
set of category-based, objective and absolute norms based on principal impera-
tives (“do good, avoid evil”), which enable rational entities to perform deeds 
that are internally good and to avoid acts that are internally wrong. Those 
16 Jarosław MERECKI, Spór o prawo naturalne. Analiza modelu argumentacji etycznej Josefa 
Fuchsa, Lublin, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 2011, 17-20.
17 Tadeusz STYCZEŃ, Filozoficzna koncepcja prawa naturalnego, in: Tadeusz Styczeń, Objawiać 
osobę, Lublin, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 2013, 205.
18 Krąpiec, Człowiek i prawo naturalne..., 196-216.
19 Wald, Natura i prawo naturalne…, 74.
20 Andrzej SZOSTEK, Prawo naturalne jako podstawa działania człowieka (normatywność natu-
ry ludzkiej), in: Maryniarczyk, Stępień, Gondek (eds), Substancja..., 40, 45-47.
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norms are within human nature. Ergo, human nature is of a moral nature. The 
drive towards optimum development through reaching proper goods, with the 
most excellent Good as the final aim and the source of happiness taking the 
highest place, is embedded in man. Nature is an objective order based on es-
sential structures of the human being, taking the form of relations between 
the internal purposefulness of structural elements and human improvement 
according to the personal pattern of his excellence. This personal pattern of 
values is finally rooted in the Transcendental value. Improvement takes place 
through rational and morally fair actions, consistent with eternal law.21
Jarosław Merecki, an anthropologist and ethicist, perceives the issue of the 
moral character of nature in a slightly different way. In his opinion, individuals 
are always given human nature. However, each person is unique as an entity 
and cannot be reduced to the nature that is common to all people. A human 
being has his nature as a certain subjective structure. Nature means an essence 
of a given person, whom we learn on the basis of features shown by specimens 
of a given species. Nature in itself does not contain any obligations, which 
emerge only in relation to freedom. Basic inclinations of human nature are not 
inclinations of a human being. Man does not have to follow them, he can deny 
them. It must be noted that an important feature of a person is transcendence, 
as a result of which man is not subject to his inclinations but can control them. 
Natural law is the law of reason, which, however, does not create this law in a 
totally autonomous way, but recognizes it in the objectively existing structure. 
Inclinations only provide the bases of law, but not the moral natural law itself. 
However, they participate in eternal law. Inclinations are the reasons for activ-
ity, due to which the man learns basic goods for himself. Therefore, a person 
can refer to his nature in a free way. However, this does not mean that each 
individual can arbitrarily determine the moral sense of human nature.22
At the same time, it should also be remembered that a human being is a 
spiritual and carnal entity, and as such, he is a personal being. In the process 
of his personal development it is therefore necessary not only to respect the 
specificity of the spirit, but also the particularity of the body structure. It is 
also morally binding as subordinate and attributed to the spirit. Natural law is 
an act of reason, which reads it in the human nature. Still, it cannot be reduced 
to the act of reason, but also the normative meaning of carnality, manifested 
in inclinations of nature, should be taken into account.23 Therefore, man is not 
only a rational creature but, first of all, a rational animal. Consequently, this 
spiritual-carnal complexity should be respected along with its dynamism, ori-
ented towards its full development. It is the more so that the man is much more 
21 Tadeusz ŚLIPKO, Zarys etyki ogólnej, Kraków, Wydawnictwo Apostolstwa Modlitwy, 2002, 
278, 282, 318-320.
22 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 135-136, 143-144, 166-169, 182.
23 Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność…, 294-296.
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deeply constituted by this complexity than he thinks.24 Nature is therefore nor-
mative and consequently, determines the relations between men and women.25
This is important in the case of sexuality, which permeates the entire hu-
man body. The female or male sex determines the shape of humanity of the 
human person and reveals the direction of its development. Sexuality also has 
a communion-forming sense of complementing femininity and masculinity. 
This unity is based on sexual distinctness, due to which one’s own identity is 
discovered. In this context, the category of gift is important. A human being is 
endowed with a body, which has a nuptial sense. The woman and the man learn 
each other and give themselves to each other through the body. Therefore, the 
“body language”, the truth of which is normative, should be read. It should be 
borne in mind that each language has a spiritual and material element. Conse-
quently, it cannot be freely developed, but already existing meanings have to be 
taken into account. Body language has to be read as it has been written into the 
bodily structure. It occurs through reason, which is read by this deeper, meta-
physical and at the same time axiologically saturated truth about the reality of 
the body.26 Therefore, attention is paid to the theleology of gender, namely, its 
purposefulness. The sense of purpose directs the entire human being.27
As Polish personalist Tadeusz Styczeń emphasizes, people draw responses 
to the questions about the necessity of action from deepened reflection on their 
spiritual and carnal structure. He also observes that this structure can tell us 
what to do, but cannot explain why it should be done. It holds no adequate 
reason for the authority that we associate with the need to act. This reason can 
be discovered by the contingency of the human being who, in his existence 
and nature, depends on the Absolute. The Absolute becomes the reason for the 
obligation to act. Nature depends existentially on God-The Absolute, whose 
intentions are revealed by the aims of nature and as such are embedded in His 
authority. An immanent truth of nature is presented, in his opinion, as tran-
scendental truth, i.e. the truth of God’s intentions. An important role is played 
by reason, whose function is to read senses of truth immanently embedded in 
nature as God’s intentions towards man. Therefore, reason does not create the 
truth, but can read and recognize it. It is the only instance capable of reading 
and announcing God’s intentions. However, moral obligation is manifested 
itself in the voice of conscience. As a result of final explanation, it seems to be 
a personal call of the transcendental “You” to the human “Self”. Obligation is 
always specified in terms of content. Its content is derived from the human na-
ture, which is an instance communicating to the human being specific content 
provided by God. Nature normalizes human behaviour, but it is also normal-
24 Szostek, Prawo naturalne jako podstawa działania człowieka…, 41, 44.
25 Bloom, Umysł zamknięty…, 132.
26 Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność…, 300-306.
27 Bloom, Umysł zamknięty…, 130.
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ized by the eternal idea of God. It is a fountain of God’s intentions towards the 
human being and his free actions. It participates in the eternal truth of God’s 
intentions and becomes natural law.28 Consequently, it can be seen that this 
concept of natural law is based on metaphysical and epistemological realism. It 
is actually typical for the entire Aristotelian-Tomistic tradition.
Ślipko also claims that the imperative power of natural law proves that it 
must have been created by an appropriate authority. No instance can be found 
in the contingent world that could explain this imperativeness to a satisfactory 
degree. In such a case, the creator of natural law can be finally only the creator 
of nature, i.e. God as a source of law for all creation. A causative reason of the 
imperativeness of natural law is therefore the act of God, which exists first 
in Him and is referred to as eternal law as an order of God’s will establishing 
moral order.29
The above-mentioned concept of natural law was subject to criticism, as a 
result of which, several weaknesses were indicated.
One of the principal objections is the anthropomorphic image of God as the 
source of law and the Lord of all beings, which is implied in this concept. God 
seems to hold certain areas of reality and impose His will on human beings, 
who must recognize them as the norm of his behaviour. However, this image 
of God and His relations towards the world is false, as He is attributed features 
typical for a hierarchically-organized society. What is emphasized is that God 
created human beings as rational and free creatures. He does not want to de-
prive the human being of these attributes.30
It is also observed that the Thomistic tradition of understanding natural 
law includes a certain ambiguity. On one hand, it is considered equivalent to 
reason, capable of learning a specific being in its relation to eternal law. How-
ever, on the other hand, this law is treated as the specific order of being, which 
should be respected. As a result of this ambiguity, two interpretations of this 
law are possible: creative or naturalistic.31
Consequently, bearing in mind the views of Georg Edward Moore, an objec-
tion concerning naturalistic fallacy is put forward. Its supporters oppose any 
attempts to define good not only through natural features, but also through 
non-empirical features (e.g. God’s order). This fallacy can occur in three princi-
pal forms: biologism (equating laws of nature in the sense applied in empirical 
sciences with moral natural law, nature regularities becoming a norm of mo-
rality), arising out of the “nature of the deed” (a subjective purpose determines 
the moral character of a human deed), and a theological form (natural inclina-
28 Styczeń, Filozoficzna koncepcja prawa naturalnego..., 207-209, 212-214, 219-224.
29 Ślipko, Zarys etyki ogólnej..., 307-308.
30 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 48-52.
31 Szostek, Prawo naturalne jako podstawa działania człowieka…, 42-43.
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tions are an expression of the Creator’s will, who embedded certain purposes 
into human beings in the act of creation).32
However, the most common objection is the fallacy of biologism, the repre-
sentatives of which treat human nature as morally binding. In the opinion of 
some contemporary philosophers and theologians, natural law does not consist 
in respecting the existing structures of nature, since it is flexible, subject to 
evolution and shaped by human beings.33 Consequently, any reference to the 
biological nature of the human being faces two significant obstacles. The first of 
them is an unauthorized transition from the fact (“is”) to the norm (“should”). 
The latter occurs in natural biological tendencies to various, sometimes oppos-
ing aims, e.g. homo- or heterosexual activity.34
The above criticism resulted in the emergence of a new concept of natural 
law. As it has been mentioned earlier, it has its source in the thought of the phi-
losophers representing the Enlightenment school of natural law, who equated 
this law with the natural reason orders. It can be claimed to have almost abso-
lute autonomy, as it was detached from eternal law.
The new concept of natural law is also based on views expressed by some 
modern philosophers, originating mainly from the German-speaking areas. 
They include Immanuel Kant (autonomy of rational agents), Johann G. Fichte 
(self-manifestation of free “self”), Georg  W.F.  Hegel (the idea of progress in 
history), Friedrich Nietzsche (“will to power”), Karl Marx (concept of human 
needs), Jean P. Sartre (existentialism) and Martin Heidegger (Dasein providing 
sense). It was also largely influenced by Karl Rahner, who differentiated between 
the human being as an intelligible person and the human being as nature. In 
his opinion, a person can decide about himself or herself in freedom. However, 
nature is the condition of free actions of a person and self-development in the 
spirit of free choice.35 
The above thoughts contributed to the emergence of the concept of a human 
being understood as freedom embedded in biological nature, which is resistant 
towards personal freedom and is governed by its own laws. However, he needs 
this nature to express freedom. In this situation, a human being is morally 
obliged to create a free self-project. Human nature was not given to man as a 
ready-made and closed reality, but rather as a subject to processes of individual 
and historical development. Therefore, historicity belongs to the essence of 
man and the world. Nevertheless, biological nature cannot be ignored, since 
it limits personal freedom to a certain extent. However, the personal entity is 
autonomous towards it, and called to create the truth about himself. Biological 
nature is a challenge for a human being, who should subordinate it to himself 
32 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 21-36.
33 Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność…, 253.
34 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 28.
35 Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność…, 43-55, 99-101.
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and to the self-project he created. With this project, the sense will be given to 
life and to the world. It is not biological nature, but the creative self-portrait 
that has normative significance for the human being. It is all the more impor-
tant since the act of human freedom expressed in the self-project is, out of its 
nature, the expression of God’s will and, for this reason, it is absolutely morally 
binding. With realization of this self-project, which is understood as giving 
man an overall sense to himself, that development and self-fulfilment of the 
human being are possible.36
Moral normativity of natural inclinations in the traditional concept of 
natural law assumed a specific understanding of the ontic structure of the hu-
man being (biological nature), which was sometimes opposed to a person as 
a being transgressing it, being unrestricted with its laws and impulses. The 
person had an opportunity to rationally and freely determine the way in which 
to realize his nature. Moreover, he was morally obliged to this. Subordinating 
the personal to the natural could mean naturalization of the human person as 
a static being. Natural law would then become a set of orders grounded and 
derived from constant and unchangeable biological nature. However, such a 
vision raises doubts among supporters of the new concept. On one hand, it is 
difficult to show in the human being such unchangeable features due to his 
historical and cultural conditions. On the other, several elements can be indi-
cated, without which it would be difficult to imagine human existence (e.g. the 
unity of soul and body, personality, interpersonal bond), but at the same time, 
it should be emphasized that those elements exist in variable realizations. Hu-
man variability can result in a change of behaviour and norms governing this 
behaviour.37
It might seem that in the opinion of supporters of the new natural law con-
cept, the idea of the precise differentiation of what is changeable and what is 
unchangeable in biological nature should be entirely abandoned, since variabil-
ity belongs to the invariable human nature. What is invariable is the obvious 
fact that the human being is human. He not only has to discover the possibili-
ties of his deeds and development on his own, but also to determine which of 
those possibilities are justified according to his self-project. In this situation, 
an individual judgement of conscience determines the norms of morality. Con-
science becomes creative, since the human being decides on his own who he 
should and wants to be.38 In his cognitive conscience, it is more the objective 
aspect that is emphasized than the subjective one. It is here that the obliga-
tion of self-fulfilment is experienced. The self-project of the individual and his 
personal uniqueness are taken here into account. The adequacy of conscience 
36 Ibidem, 150-156, 256-257, 286.
37 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 37-46.
38 Andrzej SZOSTEK, Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości, Lublin, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 
1998, 127-129, 281-282.
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judgements is measured according to their compliance with the authentic be-
liefs of the entity.39
Therefore, man differs from animals in that he is not entirely subject to the 
normalities of his biological nature. The task of a human being as a person is 
to give a personal sense to nature, following his individual understanding of 
himself. The human being and his self-understanding is therefore the norm of 
morality. However, self-understanding is based on the decision of the entity, 
which does not imply that the entity should understand himself in such a man-
ner. Self-understanding is left entirely at the disposal of the human being who 
is its author. Although he has to take into account certain biological and social 
conditions, it is him who finally has to decide what he is going to recognize as 
the binding value. Those conditions are at most the source of inspiration for 
the individual.40 Love should be expressed as respect for human freedom, i.e. 
respect for how he understands and designs himself.41
Therefore, it can be claimed that in this concept we deal with absolutisation 
of human freedom. Freedom consists in the individual’s determination of his 
self-understanding that is not determined by biological nature, as well as the 
principal direction of his development. This structure of freedom should be 
considered equal with natural law. For the human being, self-understanding, 
on the basis of which he formulates his free self-project, is morally binding. The 
evaluation of specific deeds is made in relation to the self-project of the entity. 
It is not the biological dimension of the human being that has moral signifi-
cance, but his freedom. Although it is emphasized that carnality is important 
and necessary existential of human person, the human being can provide sense 
corresponding to his free self project. A human being exists in the body out of 
necessity, but his personal development is determined by the structure of free 
spirit. The body is not, therefore, treated as a factor significantly co-shaping the 
humanity of the human being, or a source of any absolute moral norms.42 Since 
freedom is superior to biological nature, a human being can independently de-
cide about the relations in which he can enter with other people. Additionally, 
he can freely shape them.43
It should be noted that the human being is, above all, an autonomous entity, 
who has the possibility and task of self-determination. He relies on recognition 
of his own reason, through which he determines the sense that reality will 
have for him. Thus, he designs his life and deeds. In this situation, the biologi-
cal nature of the human being is only a constituting co-principle, as the main 
principle is free reason. If a human being acts as a rational and free entity, he 
39 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 97-104.
40 Ibidem, 90-91, 95, 141, 159.
41 Szostek, Natura, rozum, wolność…, 267-269.
42 Ibidem, 291-293, 323-327.
43 Bloom, Umysł zamknięty…, 133.
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preserves his dignity. Additionally, in the religious dimension, he fulfils God’s 
will.44
Conclusions
The analyses presented above had two principal aims. The first of them was 
to outline principal changes that the institution of marriage is currently un-
dergoing. The second aim was to show problems related to the definition of 
natural law, which the supporters of traditional understanding of marriage as a 
union of a man and a woman refer to. The point of reference for this discussion 
is therefore the conviction about a certain relation between an understanding 
of marriage and the underlying concept of natural law.
On the basis of the discussion presented, the following conclusions can 
be reached. First of all, marriage is a natural form of social life, accomplish-
ing specific purposes, not only with biological and psychological foundations, 
but also with social and relational aspects. Secondly, it provides a core for 
the family, by serving its procreation and upbringing function. Marriage also 
fulfils an important tasks in the development of human sexuality, which are 
important for the individuals and their relations (e.g. search for identity, at-
tachment, mutual acceptance and surrender, experience of pleasure). Thirdly, 
on the one hand, a crisis of marriage is currently observed (e.g. low stability, 
divorces, concubinages), while on the other, we can see attempts to change its 
meaning and to redefine marriage by including (at least) same-sex relation-
ships into it. Fourthly, followers of the traditional and the contemporary vi-
sion of marriage very often refer to natural law, searching in it for the reason 
to support their views, although they have different concepts concerning this 
law. Fifthly, a point of reference for representatives of the traditional vision 
is the concept of natural law which derives from the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
thought. Natural law is understood as the law of reason, which reads inclina-
tions, motives for actions in the subjective spiritual-corporal structure (human 
nature). The subject of law is a rational being, who reads senses embedded in 
biological nature but does not create them arbitrarily. Nature is the measure of 
being and the way of participating in eternal law (God). God is the final reason 
explaining not only the contingency of the human being structure, but also 
the moral duty of nature. The human nature of moral features is the source of 
sense read by reason, which should take into account the normative meaning 
not only of spirituality, but also the corporality (sexuality) of the human being. 
Spirituality and corporality reveal the direction of development of a human 
being and require fulfilment by the gift of self, based on sexual differentiation, 
44 Merecki, Spór o prawo naturalne…, 83-88.
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which takes place within marriage. Sixthly, the common concept of natural law 
is based on distinguishing two dimensions in the human structure: personal 
freedom and flexible nature. Natural law is considered equivalent to arbitrary 
freedom of a human being. A free man creates, without nature determination, 
a self-project of his own life, which is of normative significance. Specific norms 
of morality are determined by creative conscience. The self-project is based on 
self-understanding of the human being, which is actually variable. Biological 
and social conditions are only a source of inspiration, since the human being fi-
nally determines its individual sense in the context of self-project. Corporality 
is, therefore, a certain existential element, which can be given a specific sense 
according to self-understanding and self-project of the individual. A human 
being is therefore an autonomous entity who, in his freedom, designs his reality 
with reason. He also designs his own life and interpersonal relationships he ini-
tiates, including marriage. Seventhly, it seems that the value of the traditional 
natural law, in which the entire nature of the human being is respected as a 
spiritual and corporal unity of being, requires greater recognition. Therefore, 
what is morally important is not only the spiritual dimension of the human be-
ing (reason), but also his material dimension (body). Human reason, reading the 
principles of natural law, should take into account to a fuller extent and cannot 
arbitrarily create a self-project for life. Therefore, human reason has dialogical 
function and autonomous subject has relational dimension. It is all the more 
important since self-understanding upon which it is based can be erroneous, 
for various reasons. It is the effect of reason, which does not often function in 
a proper way, and sometimes is even disturbed in its activity. Additionally, the 
lack of respect for the “language of corporality” can turn against the human 
being and his self-fulfilment. Eighthly, both concepts of natural law condition 
a specific understanding of marriage. In the first case, the spiritual and physical 
structure of the human being should be respected, the sense of which should 
be read and not arbitrarily given. Its sexual differentiation requires fulfilment 
with another person of the opposite sex, which takes place first of all in het-
erosexual marriage. In the second case, the human being as an individual does 
not have to take into account conditions resulting from the existing structures 
and can give them a sense according to his self-knowledge and project of his 
own life. This leads to conviction about the broader spectrum of possibilities 
of one’s own development and other types of interpersonal relations, which are 
sometimes referred to as marriage. By the way, the question remains about the 
natural conditions of homosexuality and the possibility of sexually fulfilling 
people with this orientation. However, we will leave them unanswered, because 
it would require a deeper analysis, far beyond the issue we are interested in. 
Ninthly, a problem with defining marriage emerges. It seems that the existing 
definition of marriage should be preserved for the traditional heterosexual in-
terpersonal community, assigning at the same time other terms for other types 
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of interpersonal relations. It is particularly important in view of significant dif-
ferences between those relations (e.g. procreation abilities), which should be 
reflected in terminology. With the aim to preserve precision of the terms used, 
the blurring of their meaning should not be attempted. Tenthly, an issue con-
cerning legislative solutions concerning marriage and other types of relations 
still remains valid. In liberal-democratic states, where people of various world 
views and lifestyles live and work together, legal regulations should be created 
to establish proper frameworks for various interpersonal relations. However, 
we should not forget that the state has the right to support, even promote, cer-
tain types of interpersonal relations that are important from the perspective 
of the common good and future of the entire society. This includes marriage, 
which, apart from other important issues, ensures first of all the continued 
existence of the state community.
Karol Jasiński*
Razumijevanje braka i koncept prirodnog prava
Sažetak
Autor članka postavio je dva glavna cilja. Prvi je cilj da se, na temelju naznače-
nih definicije braka, skiciraju temeljne promjene kojima je institucija braka tre-
nutno podvrgnuta (kriza ciljeva, privatizacija, rastave, konkubinat, istospolni 
odnosi). Drugi cilj je prikaz problema vezanih uz priznavanje naravnoga prava, 
kojima se zagovara tradicionalno razumijevanje braka kao zajednice muškarca i 
žene. Polazi se od uvjerenja o stanovitom odnosu između razumijevanja braka i 
temeljnoga koncepta naravnoga prava. Prikazana su dva temeljna koncepta na-
ravnoga prava: aristotelsko-tomistički i suvremeni, čije su posljedice navedene 
u zaključcima. Oba koncepta pretpostavljaju određeno razumijevanje ljudske 
naravi koja se u prvom slučaju tretira kao statična (duhovno-fizička struktura) 
i, u drugom slučaju, kao dinamična (inteligentna sloboda).
Ključne riječi: brak, ljudska narav, naravni zakon, savjest, sloboda.
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